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Abstract
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite
set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected al-
ternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over
allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they
prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a de-
cision be eﬃcient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group
of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism
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whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an eﬃcient and stable
allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social
choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous
and group stable.
Keywords: Public Goods, Crowding Preferences, Subgame Perfect Implemen-
tation.
JEL Classification Numbers: D62, D71, H41.
1 Introduction
In many collective choice problems, after the social alternative (or public good) has
been chosen, agents may decide whether or not to use it. If the size of the final
set of users aﬀects the welfare of each member, then the decision process has to
take into account how many agents will eventually become users. In this paper we
study the case when agents’ preferences are positively aﬀected by the size of the
set of users, and participation is not compulsory. There are many examples of such
problems. Members of a club choose the amount of some non-rival public good to
be provided to themselves and the cost of its provision is usually equally shared
among the set of its final users. This choice aﬀects the composition (and the size)
of the club, since some members may choose to leave the club if the level provided
and its corresponding cost are unacceptable to them. Similarly, a local community
which decides to provide a public facility (a swimming pool, a common garden, etc.)
cannot set aside considerations regarding howmany community members support this
decision if those who are not in favor of it have the right not to pay for the facility.
Many other problems do not directly involve money but can be similarly modeled.
For instance members of a political party or a union decide which political line to
follow and this decision aﬀects their choice regarding their membership. The size of
the organization matters for all of its members, since it determines how eﬀective the
organization is in pursing its objectives. A group of nations decides which common
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technological standard to adopt. Each country may prefer a diﬀerent standard, but
once a standard is adopted, social and individual welfare are increasing in the number
of nations which agree to adopt it.
All these problems have two common features, other than the fact that agents care
about how many other agents use the public good. The final allocation to be selected
has to satisfy two properties: eﬃciency and stability. While the first requirement
is well-known and typical in most of the public decision process, the latter deserves
to be briefly mentioned. Stability requires that no agent can be forced to be a user
and that no agent who wants to be a user could be excluded. Stability may be a
necessary requirement due to institutional constraints (for instance, no nation can be
forced to adopt any technological standard, or, according to the law, agents cannot be
discriminated), but it is also a desirable property on the basis of normative principles
like freedom (free participation) and equal treatment of equals (no discriminatory
exclusion).1
The aim of this paper is to implement an eﬃcient and stable social choice function
when agents’ crowding preferences are private information.
Our analysis starts by showing that, for any crowding preference profile, the set
of eﬃcient and stable allocations is non-empty. However, we can easily establish a
negative result: no eﬃcient and stable social choice function is Nash implementable
(and therefore neither strategy-proof) because it is not Maskin monotonic. This result
is related to previous results in Jackson and Nicolò (2004) who study similar social
choice problems in a context where agents have single-peaked preferences over an
infinite and linearly ordered set of alternatives. They show that, in general, strategy-
proof and eﬃcient social choice functions must fix the group of users and not allow it
to vary with agents’ preferences. Namely, when crowding eﬀects are present strategy-
proofness and eﬃciency impose that the group of users coincide with the entire society.
Therefore, stability is incompatible with strategy-proofness and eﬃciency. But this
1See also Bogomolnaia and Nicolò (2004) for a brief discussion of the normative content of a
slightly diﬀerent definition of stability in the context of multiple provision of public goods.
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result suggests that the trade oﬀ between informational constraints and normative
properties of social choice functions could be overcome if we separate the decision of
which alternative has to be chosen from the selection of the group of its users. We
therefore investigate if an eﬃcient and stable social choice function is subgame perfect
Nash implementable. We first show that one of the suﬃcient conditions of subgame
perfect Nash implementation in Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990)
does not hold in our framework. In particular, any eﬃcient and stable social choice
function does not satisfy the no veto power condition (that together with Condition
α and that the number of agents is larger or equal than three guarantees that a social
choice function is subgame perfect Nash implementable). This is because stability
gives to any agent the power (by not being a final user) to veto an allocation which
is unanimously considered by all remaining agents as being the best one. We then
present the implementation result which also holds for the case of two agents. The
proposed two-stage game depends on an exogenously given order on the set of agents
and on a selection rule choosing an alternative from every subset of alternatives.
Roughly, it is as follows. In the first stage of the game agents sequentially (iteratively
and publicly), following the given order, propose a level of the public good and a
natural number between 1 and the number of agents (interpreted as the number of
users); among the proposed levels, one with the maximal number of users is chosen
in accordance with the selection rule. In the second stage agents sequentially (and
publicly), following the same given order, decide whether or not to use the level of
the public good chosen at the first stage.
The game is relatively simple: it is finite, bounded, and the needed out-of-
equilibrium penalties do not have to be large. Interestingly, the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the game does not depend on the order ac-
cording to which agents make their decisions; hence, the implemented social choice
function is anonymous. The mechanism selects among the set of eﬃcient and sta-
ble allocations the alternative which maximizes the number of its users (if there are
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many, it selects the one chosen by a given selection rule). We justify this maximality
property on a purely normative ground, since it allows to minimize the number of
agents with the minimum level of welfare.
Finally, our paper is also related to Bag and Winter (1999), in which the authors
propose a sequential iterated mechanism to uniquely implement a core allocation
for an economy with an excludable public good. In their model a level of a public
good is produced using a technology and the contributions of a private good made
by the final set of users. However, our setting is diﬀerent from theirs at least with
respect to the following features. First, in our setting exclusion is voluntary (our
stability notion reflects that). Second, their setting is cardinal (preferences are quasi-
linear in the private good) while our ordinal setting not only admits a larger class
of preferences but also admits problems in which the choice of a social alternative
does not generate costs. Third, in their setting eﬃciency implies no exclusion, and
thus, in the equilibrium outcome of their game all agents consume the public good;
in contrast, in our setting eﬃciency may require that only a subset of agents is the
final set of users of the public good.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we give preliminary notation and
definitions, describe the preference domain, establish the existence of eﬃcient and
stable allocations, and provide a negative result for Nash implementation. In section
3, we describe the extensive-form game and state our main result. In section 4, we oﬀer
some examples that illustrate the role of some features of the extensive-game form,
discuss on the non-neutrality of our mechanism, and give the relationship between
the set of eﬃcient and stable allocations and the set of group stable allocations. An
Appendix at the end of the paper contains the proofs omitted in the text.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents and X be the finite set of levels of a public
good (or social alternatives). We assume that n,#X ≥ 2. Subsets of N are denoted
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by S and T , elements of N by i and j, and elements of X by x and y. An allocation is
a pair (x, S) ∈ A ≡ X × 2N , where x ∈ X is the level of the public good and S ∈ 2N
is the subset of its users. Agents have preferences over the set of allocations. The
preference relation of agent i ∈ N over the set of allocations A, denoted by Ri, is a
complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation. As usual, let Pi and Ii denote the
strict and indiﬀerence preference relations induced by Ri, respectively. We assume
that preference relations satisfy the following properties:
(An) Anonymity: For all x ∈ X and S, T ∈ 2N such that i ∈ S∩T and#S = #T ,
(x, S) Ii (x, T ) .
(Crow) Crowding: For all x ∈ X and S, T ∈ 2N such that i ∈ S ∩ T and
#S > #T , (x, S)Pi (x, T ) .
(Apa) Apathy: For all x, y ∈ X and S ∈ 2N such that i /∈ S, (x, S) Ii (y, ∅) .
(Strict) Strictness: For all x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ 2N such that i ∈ S if (1) x 6= y
or (2) x = y and #S 6= #T hold, then either (x, S)Pi (y, T ) or (y, T )Pi (x, S).
Anonymity requires that agent i only cares about the number of users but not
on their identities. Crowding implies that agent i strictly prefers to use the public
good with larger groups. Apathy says that agent i does not care about the level of
the public good if he does not use it.2 Finally, Strictness requires that agent i is
never indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent allocations with the properties that i is a user
of at least one of them and the two allocations diﬀer either on the level of the public
good and/or on the size of its users.
A preference relationRi satisfying these four properties is called a crowding prefer-
ence relation andRi denotes the set of all such preference relations for agent i. Notice
2Note that when the public good to be chosen has some type of externality, even those members
who are not direct users may have strict preferences over which alternative has to be selected.
In these cases (Apa) turns to be a too restrictive assumption. Nevertheless in many interesting
contexts, like the provision of club goods, it seems a natural assumption.
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that all four conditions are agent specific and therefore Ri 6= Rj for diﬀerent agents
i and j. Observe that the set of crowding preferences for agent i admits preferences
with very diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between the selected level of the public good and the size
of its users; for instance, a crowding preference Ri might well order (x, {i})Pi(y,N).
A profile R = (R1, ..., Rn) is a n-tuple of crowding preference relations. Let
R = R1× ...×Rn be the set of profiles. To emphasize the role of agent i’s preference
relation a profile R is represented by (Ri, R−i).
We say that an allocation (y, T ) Pareto dominates the allocation (x, S), denoted
by (y, T )PD(x, S), if (y, T )Ri (x, S) for all i ∈ N and (y, T )Pj (x, S) for at least one
j ∈ N .
Definition 1 An allocation (x, S) is eﬃcient under R if it is not Pareto dominated
by any other allocation.
Definition 2 An allocation (x, S) is stable under R if for all i ∈ N :
(Internal Stability) i ∈ S implies (x, S)Pi (x, S\{i}).
(External Stability) i /∈ S implies (x, S)Pi (x, S ∪ {i}).
Observe that (Apa) implies that if (x, S) is internally stable then, i ∈ S implies
(x, S)Pi(x, {∅}). Given a profile R ∈ R, let Z (R) denote the set of eﬃcient and stable
allocations under R. Proposition 1 below establishes the fact that for all R ∈ R the
set of eﬃcient and stable allocations under R is non-empty. But first, we show two
preliminary results concerning eﬃcient and stable allocations. Lemma 1 says that for
each level of the public good x we can find a (maximal) set of users Sx for which the
allocation (x, Sx) is stable.
Lemma 1 Let R ∈ R be given. For each x ∈ X there exists a unique Sx ∈ 2N such
that (x, Sx) ∈ A is stable under R and for any T ∈ 2N such that (x, T ) ∈ A is stable
under R, #Sx ≥ #T.
Proof Let R ∈ R and x ∈ X be given. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n define the set Nk(x) =©
i ∈ N | there exists S ∈ 2N such that (x, S)Pi(x, ∅) and #S = k
ª
.Observe first that
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#N0(x) = 0 and, by (Crow), N0(x) ⊂ N1(x) ⊂ ... ⊂ Nn(x). Take the maximal k
such that #Nk(x) = k and set Sx ≡ Nk(x). By construction, (x, Sx) ∈ A is stable
under R and if (x, T ) ∈ A is stable under R then #Sx ≥ #T . ¥
We call the stable allocation (x, Sx) identified in Lemma 1 the stable and eﬃcient
allocation relative to x, and refer to Sx as themaximal stable set of users of x. In fact
such allocation can be Pareto dominated only by another (stable) allocation (y, T )
with y 6= x.
Lemma 2 Let R ∈ R be given. If (x, S) ∈ A is stable but not eﬃcient under R,
then there exists another (y, T ) ∈ A stable under R such that (y, T ) Pareto dominates
(x, S).
Proof Let R ∈ R be given. Assume that (x, S) ∈ A is stable but not eﬃcient
under R. Then, there exists (y, S0) ∈ A such that (y, S0)Ri(x, S) for all i ∈ N and
(y, S0)Pj(x, S) for some j ∈ N. Since (x, S) is stable underR, by (Apa), (x, S)Pi(x, ∅)
for all i ∈ S. Since (y, S0)PD (x, S) then S0 ⊇ S and, by (Apa), (y, S0)Pj(y, ∅) for
all j ∈ S. Suppose that there exists i ∈ S0 such that (y, ∅)Pi (y, S0) , then i /∈ S, but
then (x, S)Pi(y, S0) which is a contradiction. Finally, let T ∈ 2N be such that there
does not exist any i /∈ T for whom (y, T ∪ {i})Pi (y, ∅) . By (Crow), (y, T )Ri (y, S0)
for all i ∈ N and (y, T ) is stable under R. By transitivity of Ri, (y, T )Ri(x, S) for all
i ∈ N and (y, T )Pj(x, S) for some j ∈ N . Hence, (y, T )PD(x, S). ¥
Lemmata 1 and 2 have two important consequences. First, to know whether or
not a stable allocation is eﬃcient it is enough to check that is not Pareto dominated
by any other stable allocation. Second, given that the set of stable allocations is not
empty, the set of stable and eﬃcient allocations is non-empty. We state this second
consequence as Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 For all R ∈ R, Z(R) 6= ∅.
Proof Let R ∈ R be given. Consider any stable allocation (x, Sx) under R, whose
existence is established by Lemma 1. If (x, Sx) is eﬃcient under R, Proposition 1
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follows; otherwise, by Lemma 2, there exists a stable allocation (z, Sz) under R which
Pareto dominates (x, Sx). Since X is finite and the Pareto dominance relation is
transitive, there must exist a stable and eﬃcient allocation (y, Sy) under R. ¥
Among the set of eﬃcient and stable allocations we will be specially interested on
those that have the largest set of users. Given R ∈ R, define
MP (R) = {(x, S) ∈ Z(R) | #S ≥ #T for all (y, T ) ∈ Z(R)} .
Observe that since Z(R) is non-empty and finite, MP (R) 6= ∅ for all R ∈ R. We will
refer to the setMP (R) as the maximal participation set. In our setting the minimum
level of welfare that any agent i can get is the level that i obtains in any allocation
(x, S) where i /∈ S. In fact, stability guarantees that each agent can always refuse to
use the public good and, by (Apa), all allocations where agent i is not a user are
indiﬀerent for him. Maximality hence guarantees that the final allocation minimizes
the number of agents with the minimum level of welfare. Therefore, it is a normative
property inspired by a rawlsian maxmin principle.
A social choice function is a mapping ϕ : R → X × 2N selecting an allocation
for each preference profile. A social choice function is eﬃcient and stable if, for each
R ∈ R, the allocation ϕ (R) is eﬃcient and stable under R.
Information about individual preferences is often not available to the decision-
maker. In addition, the institution under which the social decision has to be taken
may give to each agent the right to claim as one’s own any crowding preference (even
if it is known that this is not the case). Therefore, if we want the choice of the
allocation to be dependent on the preference profile (in the appropriate way to insure
eﬃciency and stability), we have to design a mechanism to implement an eﬃcient and
stable social choice function. But it is easy to prove that no eﬃcient and stable social
choice function is Nash implementable in the set of profiles of crowding preference
relations. Before stating this result we need some additional notation and definitions.
A mechanism (or game form) is a pair (M,Φ) where M = M1 × ... × Mn is
a Cartesian product of message spaces (one for each agent) and Φ : M → A is
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an outcome function. Thus, each player i submits a message mi ∈ Mi and, given
(m1, ...,mn) ∈ M , the allocation Φ(m1, ...,mn) is selected. A social choice function
ϕ : R → A is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism (M,Φ) such that for
all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) = Φ(m∗1, ...,m∗n) for all Nash equilibria (m∗1, ...,m∗n) ∈ M of the
induced normal form game (N, (M,Φ), R). A social choice function ϕ : R → A is
Maskin monotonic if for any R ∈ R, R0 ∈ R, and a = ϕ(R) such that a 6= ϕ(R0)
there exist i ∈ N and b ∈ A such that aRib and bP 0ia. Maskin monotonicity is a
necessary condition for a social choice function to be Nash implementable.3
Proposition 2 No eﬃcient and stable social choice function ϕ : R → X × 2N is
Nash implementable.
Proof Let ϕ : R→ X × 2N be an eﬃcient and stable social choice function. Take
x, y ∈ X arbitrary and select any profile R ∈ R of crowding preference relations with
the following properties: (1) for all i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N such that S 6= N , (z,N)Pi(z0, S)
for all z, z0 ∈ X; (2) (x,N)P1(z,N) for all z 6= x; and (3) for all i 6= 1, (y,N)Pi(z,N)
for all z 6= y. By eﬃciency and stability, ϕ(R) = (zˆ, N) for some zˆ ∈ X. Without
loss of generality, assume that zˆ 6= x. Consider now the crowding preference relation
R01 ∈ R1 with the following properties: (1) for all S, S0 ∈ 2N such that 1 ∈ S ∩ S0,
(y, S)P 01(y
0, S0) if and only if (y, S)P1(y0, S0) and (2) (x,N)P 01(x, ∅)P 01(z,N) for all
z 6= x. By stability, if ϕ(R01, R−1) = (z, S) with z 6= x then 1 /∈ S. Therefore, by
eﬃciency, ϕ(R01, R−1) = (x,N). Hence, ϕ(R) = (zˆ, N), ϕ(R
0) = (x,N) 6= (zˆ, N), and
for all j 6= 1, Rj = R0j. Thus, Maskin monotonicity is violated since (x,N) is the best
alternative for agent 1 according to R1 and R01. Thus, the eﬃcient and stable social
choice function ϕ is not Nash implementable. ¥
Remark 1 Jackson and Nicolò (2004) showed that, in the continuous version of our
model, there are no strategy-proof, eﬃcient, internally stable, and outsider indepen-
dent social choice functions on the domain of crowding and single-peaked preference
3See, for instance, Maskin (1999)’s original paper or Jackson (2001)’s survey on implementation
theory.
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relations.4 Since negative implementation results on smaller domains are stronger,
observe that the preference profile R ∈ R and the preference relation R01 ∈ R1 used
in the proof of Proposition 2 might be single-peaked. Hence, the proof of Proposition
2 shows that any eﬃcient and stable social choice function defined on the domain of
crowding and single-peaked preference relations is not fully Nash implementable.
3 The Implementation
Given the impossibility to implement any eﬃcient and stable social choice function
as Nash equilibria of a game in normal form, we now address the natural question
whether it is possible to implement some of them as Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
(SPNE) of a game in extensive form. However, we will not be able to apply directly
general results of the implementation theory because eﬃcient and stable social choice
functions do not satisfy one of the suﬃcient conditions for SPNE implementation in
both Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990). In our setting a social
choice function ϕ : R → X × 2N satisfies the no veto power condition if, whenever
some allocation (x, S) ∈ X × 2N is top-ranked for at least n − 1 agents at profile
R ∈ R then ϕ(R) = (x, S). Example 1 below shows that the no veto power condition
is incompatible with internal stability. Free participation, in fact, must be guaranteed
even if all the other agents have a common preferred allocation, which might require
that the set of users be the full set of agents.
Example 1 Let X = {x, y}. Consider any N = {1, ..., n} and let R ∈ R be any
4A social choice function ϕ : R → X × 2N is outsider independent if for all i ∈ N, R ∈ R and
R0i ∈ Ri, if i /∈ S ∪ S0 where (x, S) = ϕ(R) and (x0, S0) = ϕ(R0i, R−i), then ϕ(R) = ϕ(R0i, R−i).
Assume X is endowed with a linear order ≤. A preference relation Ri ∈ Ri is single-peaked if
there exists p (Ri) ∈ X such that for all x, y ∈ X
y < x ≤ p (Ri) or p (Ri) ≤ x < y implies (x, S)Pi (y, S) ,
for all S ∈ 2N such that i ∈ S.
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crowding preference profile such that for all i 6= 1, (x,N)Pi (z, S) for all (z, S) 6=
(x,N), and (x, ∅)P1(x,N). Let ϕ : R → X × 2N be a stable social choice function.
The no veto power condition requires that ϕ(R) = (x,N). But, since the allocation
(x,N) is not stable under R, the stability of ϕ implies that ϕ(R) 6= (x,N).
The structure of the problem (the social choice has two components: the level of
the public good and the set of its users) as well as previous results in similar frame-
works (see Bogomolnaia and Nicolò (2004) and Jackson and Nicolò (2004)) suggest
that in order to achieve eﬃciency and stability the selection of the alternative to be
chosen and the group of its users must be separated. Therefore a two-stage mech-
anism seems to be a natural way to implement an eﬃcient and stable social choice
function. But before proceeding any further, there is another aspect that deserves to
be briefly mentioned. Mechanisms constructed to prove general SPNE implementa-
tion results are unbounded and infinite. They contain, for instance, integer subgames
(without Nash equilibria) or large out-of-equilibrium penalties. In contrast, our pro-
posed mechanism has the following simple features: each player has a finite set of
choices and strategies, out-of-equilibrium penalties may be (infinitely) small, and all
subgames have Nash equilibria.
Since the maximal participation set MP (R) might have several allocations, to
define our two-stage game that implements in SPNE a social choice function selecting,
for each preference profile R ∈ R, an allocation in the setMP (R), we need a selection
rule on the subsets of X. Let H : 2X → X be any selection rule (i.e., H(X ) ∈ X
for all X ∈ 2X\{∅} and H(∅) ∈ X) with the following independence of irrelevant
alternatives property: If x ∈ X ( Y and H(X ) 6= x then H(Y) 6= x. For instance, if
the set of alternatives X has a linear order, the selection rule could choose from each
set X ⊆ X its smallest alternative. Now, given H, define the social choice function
ϕH : R → X × 2N as follows: for each R ∈ R, let ϕH(R) = (x, S), where (x, S) ∈
MP (R) and x = H({y ∈ X |there exists T ∈ 2N such that (y, T ) ∈MP (R)}).
Let σ : {1, ..., n}→ N be a one-to-one mapping representing an exogenously given
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order of agents; namely, σ (t) = i means that agent i is in the tth position according to
the ordering σ. Let Σ be the set of all n! possible orderings and denote by Pre (i, σ)
the set of predecessors of agent i according to σ. Namely,
Pre (i, σ) =
©
j ∈ N | σ−1 (j) < σ−1 (i)ª .
To iterate a given order σ : {1, ..., n} → N , extend σ to σˆ : N → N as follows:
given n ∈ N, the number of agents, each integer m ∈ N can uniquely be written as
m = tn+r for some t ∈ N∪{0} and 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Define this number r as r ≡ m[modn].
Then, set σˆ(m) = σ(m[modn]).
3.1 The Extensive-Game Form Γσ,H
Let σ : {1, ..., n}→ N and H : 2X → X be given.
• Stage 1:
— Step 1: agent i = σ(1) proposes either pi = (xi, ki) ∈ X × {1, ..., n} ≡ A
or does not propose anything (identified as the proposal pi = (NP, 0)).
Assume that m proposals pσˆ(1), ..., pσˆ(m) have already been made. Define
Am = {pσˆ(q) | pσˆ(q) = (xσˆ(q), kσˆ(q)) ∈ A for some 1 ≤ q ≤ m} and let k¯m be
the maximum among {kσˆ(1), ..., kσˆ(m)} (set k¯m = 0 if Am = ∅).
— Step m+1: agent i = σˆ(m+1) proposes either pi = (xi, ki) ∈ A\Am such
that ki ≥ k¯m or does not propose anything (pi = (NP, 0)).
If after the first n steps all agents proposed (NP, 0) then the game ends
with the outcome (H(∅), ∅). Otherwise, let m > 1 be the first step such
that pσˆ(m) = (xσˆ(m), kσˆ(m)) ∈ A and pσˆ(m+1) = ... = pσˆ(m+n) = (NP, 0).
Given pσˆ(1), ..., pσˆ(m), define
xˆ = H({x ∈ X | ∃1 ≤ q ≤ m s.t. pσˆ(q) = (x, k) and k = kσˆ(m)}).
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Set kˆ = kσˆ(m) and ıˆ = σˆ(q) where q is such that pσˆ(q) = (xˆ, kˆ). Then, the
outcome of Stage 1 is (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A×N ; namely, a proposal (xˆ, kˆ) and the
agent ıˆ who made it.
Each proposer has to burden an ε-cost if none of her proposals is the
selected one at Stage 1, (xˆ, kˆ).5
• Stage 2: Each agent j, knowing the outcome (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A × N of Stage 1 and
the decision of j’s predecessors, announces sequentially (following the order σ)
whether he wants to use (denoted by u) or not to use (denoted by nu) the public
good at level xˆ.
The final set of users of xˆ is the set of agents who have announced to be willing
to be a user, only if this set contains at least kˆ agents; otherwise, no agent
uses xˆ. Agent ıˆ, who made the proposal (xˆ, kˆ) in Stage 1, has to burden an
additional ε-cost if he is not a user of xˆ; i.e., either (xˆ, ∅) is selected, and/or i
announced nu.
3.2 Strategies
A consumption strategy of agent i in Stage 1 is a choice of a feasible proposal at
each of i’s information sets. We assume that agents only use stationary consumption
strategies in the sense that, among the set of pairs previously proposed (if any), their
decisions only depend upon those proposals with a maximum number of users.6 Thus,
5We do not put any restrictions on these ε-costs. In particular, and to be consistent with our
ordinal setting, they can be non-transferable. But, if we embed the ordinal setting into a cardinal
one, these ε-costs can be interpreted as monetary fines (potentially, infinitely small). These ε-costs
are only used in the proof of our main result to take away from agents the incentives (which exist
due to indiﬀerences) of making a proposal that has no eﬀect to themselves (because, independently
of whether or not this proposal is made, the proposer will not use the finally chosen alternative),
yet the proposal has influence on the outcome of Stage 1.
6The other proposals with an smaller number of users have already been excluded as possible
outcomes of Stage 1, regardless of the given selection rule. Observe that we could restrict a bit further
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the sets of choices of agent i in Stage 1, denoted by Fi(·), are the following. At the
information set (NP, 0) where no predecessor has made a proposal yet, Fi(NP, 0) =
A ∪ {(NP, 0)}. To denote the information sets in which at least one predecessor has
already made a proposal, define Ck = {(x0, k) ∈ A | x0 ∈ X}; then at the information
set Ck ⊆ Ck,
Fi(Ck) =
©
(x0, k0) ∈ A\Ck | k0 ≥ k
ª
∪ {(NP, 0)}.
A consumption strategy for agent i in Stage 1 is a rule fi(·) that selects, for each i’s
information set, a feasible proposal: fi(NP, 0) ∈ Fi(NP, 0) and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and
all Ck ⊆ Ck, fi(Ck) ∈ Fi(Ck). Let Fi be the set of consumption strategies of agent i
in Stage 1 and let fi be a generic element of this set.
Assume that the outcome of Stage 1 is (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A × N .7 In Stage 2, and after
knowing (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), agents decide sequentially whether or not they would like to use the
public good at level xˆ with at least kˆ users. Given σ ∈ Σ, the set of participation
strategies of agent i at the subgame starting at (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A × N , Γσ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), is the
set of functions
Bσi (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) =
n
bi[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ)] : 2Pre(i,σ) → {u, nu}
o
,
where bσi [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] (S) specifies whether or not agent i is willing to use the public good
at level xˆ, given that the set of agents in S ∈ 2Pre(i,σ) have already announced that
they are willing to do so, ıˆ made the proposal (xˆ, kˆ), and kˆ users are necessary. Let
Bσi =
S
(xˆ,kˆ,ˆı)∈A×N B
σ
i (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) denote the set of participation strategies of agent i in
Stage 2 and let bσi be a generic element of this set. Given σ ∈ Σ, let Gσi = Fi × Bσi
denote the set of strategies of agent i. A strategy profile gσ = (f, bσ) ∈ F × Bσ
is an n-tuple of strategies, where F = F1 × ... × Fn and Bσ = Bσ1 × ... × Bσn. Let
Gσ = Gσ1 × ...×Gσn be the set of strategy profiles.
the stationarity of the strategies by applying the selection rule to the set of proposed alternatives
with a maximum number of users, but then they would depend on the specific selection rule.
7Note that if after the first n steps all agents proposed (NP, 0) the game does not move to Stage
2 and ends with the outcome (H(∅), ∅).
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3.3 Outcome Functions
Given an order σ ∈ Σ and a consumption strategy profile f ∈ F , let pσˆ(m)(f) be the
proposal made by agent σˆ(m) according to f at Step m of Stage 1. Denote the path
generated by f by pathσ(f) = {pσˆ(1)(f), ..., pσˆ(M)(f)}, where M is the last step of
Stage 1. Given a selection rule H : 2X → X, the outcome of Stage 1 generated by f
is
oσ,H1 (f) =



(H(∅), ∅) if pathσ(f) = {(NP, 0), ..., (NP, 0)| {z }
n−times
}
(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) otherwise,
where (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) is defined in the obvious (but tedious) way. Given a consumption
strategy profile f ∈ F , we define the indicator function of agent i ∈ N , εσ,H1 (f)i,
where 1 means that agent i has made some proposal and none of them has been
selected. Namely,
εσ,H1 (f)i =



1 if ∃ 1 ≤ m ≤M s.t. σˆ(m) = i, pσˆ(m)(f) 6= (NP, 0), and i 6= ıˆ
0 otherwise.
Given an order σ ∈ Σ, an outcome of Stage 1 in which at least a proposal has been
made (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A×N , and a participation strategy profile bσ ∈ Bσ define recursively
(in the obvious and tedious way) the indicator function of the decision of agent j
along the play of the subgame starting at (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) generated by the profile bσ as
πj(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) =



1 if agent j announced u
0 if agent j announced nu.
Let S(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) ≡ {j ∈ N | πj(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 1} be the set of agents that announced
their willingness to be a user along the play generated by the participation strategy
profile bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]. Then, the outcome of Stage 2 starting at (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) generated by
bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] is
oσ2(b
σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) =



(xˆ, S(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ])) if #S(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) ≥ kˆ
(xˆ, ∅) otherwise;
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that is, the set of final users is the set of agents who announced u, S(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]), as
long as its cardinality is larger or equal than kˆ; otherwise, no agent becomes a user.
Moreover, let εσ2(b
σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) indicate whether or not agent ıˆ (who proposed (xˆ, kˆ)) is a
final user of the public good; namely,
εσ2(b
σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) =



1 if either oσ2(b
σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = (xˆ, ∅) or πıˆ(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 0
0 otherwise.
Finally, define the outcome function oσ,H : Gσ → A of the overall extensive-game
form Γσ,H as follows. For each (f, bσ) = ((f1, bσ1) , ..., (fn, bσn)) ∈ Gσ,
oσ,H (f, bσ) =



oσ2(b
σ[oσ,H1 (f)]) if o
σ,H
1 (f) 6= (H(∅), ∅)
(H(∅), ∅) otherwise.
Additionally, to keep track of who has to burden the ε-cost, given an strategy profile
(f, bσ) ∈ Gσ, define: for each i ∈ N ,
εi(f, bσ) =



εσ2(b
σ[oσ,H1 (f)]) if i = ıˆ, where ıˆ is s.t. o
σ,H
1 (f) = (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ)
εσ,H1 (f)i otherwise.
3.4 The Implementation Result
Given a preference profile R ∈ R we define, for each ordering σ ∈ Σ and selection
rule H : 2X → X, the game in extensive form
Γσ,H (R) =
¡
N,Gσ, oσ,H , R
¢
.
The main result of the paper states that the extensive-game form Γσ,H = (N,Gσ, oσ,H)
implements in SPNE the social choice function ϕH : R→ A. Formally,
Theorem 1 Let R ∈ R, σ ∈ Σ, and H : 2X → X be given. The allocation ϕH(R) is
the unique SPNE outcome of Γσ,H(R).
Proof See the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Observe that Theorem 1 implies that the unique SPNE outcome of Γσ,H(R) does
not depend on σ. Moreover, Lemma 3 below states that no agent has to burden an
ε-cost in equilibrium.
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Lemma 3 Let R ∈ R, σ ∈ Σ, and H be given. Assume (f, bσ) is a SPNE of Γσ,H(R).
Then, for all i ∈ N , εi(f, bσ) = 0.
Proof See the Appendix at the end of the paper.
4 Final Remarks
4.1 Extensive-Game Form
Our mechanism is less simple than we would like. First, in Stage 1 the order in which
agents make proposals has to be iterated until all n agents do not make new proposals
(if j reacts to i’s proposal, i should still be able to counteract). Second, proposers
have to be burdened with a cost (which may be very “small”) in the case that none of
their proposals has been selected at Stage 1, or the proposer ıˆ of the chosen proposal
at Stage 1 is either not a final user and/or the number of those who declared their
willingness to be users in Stage 2 is smaller than the integer kˆ proposed by ıˆ in Stage
1.8 In the following examples we show that these features are indispensable. In each
example we consider the extensive-game form described in Section 3, except that we
remove from the original extensive-game form one of the above features.
Example 2 (The order σ of proposals in Stage 1 is not iterated) Let X = {x, y, z},
N = {1, 2}, and consider the following selection rule: H({x, y, z}) = H({x, y}) =
H({x, z}) = x and H({y, z}) = y. Take any R ∈ R such that
(z, {1})P1 (x, {1})P1 (y, {∅})P1 (y, {1, 2})
and
(y, {2})P2 (z, {∅}) I2 (x, {∅})P2 (z, {1, 2})P2 (x, {1, 2}) .
Observe that Z(R) = {(z, {1}) , (y, {2})} . Fix σ(1) = 1 and σ(2) = 2. It is easy to
check that the unique SPNE outcome of the game without iterating σ in Stage 1 is
8The idea of using either small penalties or awards in implementation theory is not new (see Abreu
and Mastushima (1994) for penalties and Benoit and Ok (2004) and Sanver (2004) for awards).
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the ineﬃcient allocation (x, {1}). Fix now σ0(1) = 2 and σ0(2) = 1. Then, the unique
SPNE outcome of the game is the allocation (z, {1}). Hence, without the iteration of
the order in which proposals are made in Stage 1 the SPNE outcome might depend
on the exogenously given order, and more importantly, it might be ineﬃcient.
Example 3 (To make a proposal is never costly) Consider the same X, N , H, and
R of Example 2. Now, the ineﬃcient allocation (x, {1}) is a SPNE outcome of the
game since there exists a SPNE in which agent 2 first announces (y, 1) and then agent
1 announces (x, 1).
Example 4 (The proposer that is not a final user does not have to burden a cost) Let
X = {x, y, z} andN = {1, 2, 3} . Consider the preference profileR = (R1, R2, R3) ∈ R
where agents 1 and 2 have the same preference relations as in Example 2 and let R3
be such that
(x, {∅})P3 (x, {N})P3 (y, {N})P3 (z, {N}) .
Consider the selection rule H of Example 2. Suppose that σ(1) = 3. There is a SPNE
in which agent 3 proposes (x, 1) in Stage 1, no other agent proposes anything else
(since H(X ) = x if x ∈ X ). Therefore, the final SPNE outcome is the ineﬃcient
allocation (x, {1}).
Example 5 (Proposer ıˆ does not have to burden a cost when the number of agents
willing to use xˆ is smaller than kˆ) Consider the same X, N , H, and R of Example
4. There is a SPNE in which agent 3 proposes (x, 3) and the final SPNE outcome is
the ineﬃcient and non-externally stable allocation (x, {∅}).
4.2 Neutrality
The social choice function ϕH : R → A implemented in SPNE by our mechanism is
anonymous but not neutral. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the
selection rule H used to select a single alternative for each possible set of alternatives.
It is natural to ask whether it is possible to implement the social choice correspondence
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ψ : R³ A, where for each R ∈ R, ψ(R) =MP (R). The answer is positive and easy
for the case n ≥ 3. Let H be the set of all possible selection rules. Add a preliminary
stage in the extensive-game form in which all agents simultaneously announce some
H ∈ H. Given R ∈ R, if at least n− 1 agents announce the same H then they play
the game Γσ,H(R), otherwise the game Γσ,H0(R) is played with a prespecified selection
rule H 0. It is straightforward to check that, for all R ∈ R, the set of SPNE outcomes
of this enlarged game coincides with the maximal participation set MP (R).
4.3 Group Stability
Our notion of stability refers to individual decisions. According to our definition a
stable allocation is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game played once the
public alternative is already selected (see Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2003)
for more on this interpretation). We now want to establish the relationship between
the set of eﬃcient and stable allocations and the set of group stable allocations. We
first state the definition of group stability.
Definition 3 An allocation (x, S) is group stable under R if:
(Internal Group Stability) there does not exist T ⊆ S such that, for all i ∈ T ,
(x, S\T )Pi(x, S);
(External Group Stability) there does not exists any T ⊆ N\S such that, for
all i ∈ T , (x, S ∪ T )Pi(x, S).
Lemma 4 Let R ∈ R be given. An allocation (x, S) is group stable under R if and
only if it is individually stable under R and eﬃcient relative to x.
Proof Let (x, Sx) be an allocation with the largest stable group. Assume that
there exists T such that T ⊆ N\Sx such that, for all i ∈ T , (x, Sx ∪ T )Pi(x, Sx). Let
T 0 ⊇ T be the group of agents with maximal cardinality such that, for all i ∈ T 0,
(x, Sx ∪ T 0)Pi(x, Sx)Ii(x, ∅). By (Crow), this contradicts that Sx was the largest
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stable group since, for all i ∈ Sx, (x, Sx∪T 0)Pi(x, Sx)Pi(x, ∅). Group internal stability
follows by (Crow) and because, by internal stability, (x, Sx)Pi(x, ∅) for all i ∈ Sx.
Let (x, S) be a group stable allocation under R and let (x, Sx) be the stable
allocation under R and eﬃcient relative to x. Suppose that #Sx > #S and define
T = Sx\S. Observe that, for all i ∈ T , (x, S∪T )Pi(x, S), contradicting external group
stability. ¥
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We proceed by backwards induction. First, we prove that for any outcome (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) of
Stage 1, the subgame Γσ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) has a unique SPNE outcome (Proposition 3). Then,
we show that the outcome of any SPNE of the game Γσ,H(R) satisfies the desirable
properties (Proposition 4). Finally, we demonstrate that the SPNE outcome of the
game Γσ,H(R) is unique and coincides with ϕH(R) (Proposition 5).
Proposition 3 Let R ∈ R and σ ∈ Σ be given. For each outcome of Stage 1
(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A × N the subgame Γσ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) has a unique SPNE outcome. Moreover
for every SPNE strategy bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] of Γσ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ),
oσ2(b
σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) =



(xˆ, Sxˆ) if #Sxˆ ≥ kˆ
(xˆ, ∅) otherwise,
where Sxˆ is the maximal stable set of users of xˆ.
Proof Consider agent σ(n) and let T ∈ 2Pre(σ(n),σ) be an arbitrary information set
of agent σ(n). By (Strict) agent σ(n) orders strictly the two allocations (xˆ, ∅) and
(xˆ, T ∪ {σ(n)}) . We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: #(T ∪ {σ(n)}) ≥ kˆ.
If (xˆ, ∅)Pσ(n) (xˆ, T ∪ {σ(n)}) then, for any SPNE participation strategy bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ], we
have bσσ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ](T ) = nu and the SPNE outcome of the subgame starting at T is
(xˆ, ∅) if #T < kˆ or (xˆ, T ) if #T ≥ kˆ.
If (xˆ, T ∪ {σ(n)})Pσ(n) (xˆ, ∅) then, for any SPNE participation strategy bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ], we
have bσσ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ](T ) = u and the SPNE outcome of the subgame starting at T is
(xˆ, T ∪ {σ(n)}) .
Case 2: # {T ∪ {σ(n)}} < kˆ.
Then any SPNE outcome of the subgame starting at T is (xˆ, ∅). However, consider
the participation strategy b˜σσ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] of agent σ(n) that coincides with b
σ
σ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]
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but at all information sets T 0 where #T 0 + 1 < kˆ it is defined by
b˜σσ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ](T
0) =



u if σ(n) ∈ Sxˆ
nu otherwise.
Thus, by the backwards induction principle, we can replace the information set T of
σ(n) by the unique outcome previously identified, generated also by the participation
strategy profile b˜σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] = (b˜σσ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ], b
σ
−σ(n)[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]). Following the induction argu-
ment we obtain the uniqueness of the outcome and a SPNE strategy b˜σ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ). More-
over, it is straightforward to check that for all i ∈ N , πi(b˜σ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = πi(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 1
if and only if i ∈ Sxˆ. Therefore oσ2(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) has the desired property. ¥
Corollary 1 Let R ∈ R and σ, σ0 ∈ Σ be given. Let (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) ∈ A×N be the outcome
of Stage 1. Assume bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] is a SPNE of the subgame Γσ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) and bσ0 [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] is a
SPNE of the subgame Γσ0(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ). Then, oσ2(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = oσ
0
2 (b
σ0 [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]).
Proposition 4 Let R ∈ R, σ ∈ Σ, and H : 2X → X be given. Assume (f, bσ) is a
SPNE of Γσ,H(R). Then,
(1) oσ,H (f, bσ) is stable under R.
(2) oσ,H (f, bσ) is eﬃcient under R.
(3) oσ,H (f, bσ) belongs to the maximal participation set MP (R).
Proof Since Γσ,H(R) is a finite extensive form game with perfect information it
has at least a SPNE in pure strategies. Let (f, bσ) be a SPNE of Γσ,H (R) and let
oσ,H(f, bσ) = (x, S) ∈ A be its outcome. We first establish the following two claims.
Claim 1 If i /∈ S then εi(f, bσ) = 0.
Proof of Claim 1 Assume i /∈ S and εi(f, bσ) 6= 0 holds. This means that agent i
made a proposal in A at Stage 1. Consider the strategy (f˜i, b˜σi ) where f˜i(·) = (NP, 0)
and for all (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), b˜σi [xˆ, kˆ, ˆ](T ) = nu for all T ∈ 2Pre(i,σ). Using this strategy i does
not consume the public good neither he has to burden any cost. Hence, (fi, bσi ) is not
one of his best replies to (f−i, bσ−i).
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Claim 2 Let (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ) be an outcome of Stage 1 and assume there exists i ∈ N such
that πi(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 0. Consider the strategy b˜σi that coincides with b
σ
i except that
πi(b˜σi [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ], b
σ
−i[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 1; then, for all j ∈ N such that πj(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 1 we have
πj(b˜σi [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ], b
σ
−i[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 1.
Proof of Claim 2 It follows immediately from the following observation: since
bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] is a SPNE of the subgame starting at (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), by (Crow), for all j ∈ N,
bσj [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] (T ) = u implies b
σ
j [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ] (T
0) = u for all T, T 0 ∈ 2Pr e(σ,j) with#T 0 ≥ #T+1.
(1) oσ,H (f, bσ) is stable under R.
If i ∈ S and (x, ∅)Pi(x, S) then i is not best-replying since the strategy b˜σi that
coincides with bσi except that πi(b˜
σ
i [xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ], b
σ
−i[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 0 has the property that
oσ,H(f, (bσ−i, b˜
σ
i )) = (x, T ) with i /∈ T. Hence (x, S) is internally stable. To show
that (x, S) is externally stable, assume i /∈ S and
(x, S ∪ {i})Pi(x, ∅). (1)
We distinguish between two diﬀerent cases:
Case 1.1: S = ∅.
(1.1.1) oσ,H1 (f) = (H(∅), ∅). Consider f˜i(NP, 0) = (x, 1). If o
σ,H
1 (f−i, f˜i) = (x, 1, i),
that is, nobody else made a proposal after (x, 1), then by (1) and Proposition 3,
(x, Sx) = oσ,H(f−i, f˜i, bσ)Pioσ,H (f, bσ) = (x, ∅), contradicting that gσ is a SPNE of
Γσ,H(R). If oσ,H1 (f−i, f˜i) = (y, k, j) 6= (x, 1, i), with k ≥ 1, that is, agent j made
the definitive proposal of Stage 1 triggered by i0s deviation. Observe that by Claim
2 πj(bσ(y, k, j)) = 1. Let m be the step at which agent j proposed (y, k) after i0s
deviation; namely, j = σˆ(m), pσˆ(m)(f−i, f˜i) = (y, k) and, pσˆ(m+1)(f−i, f˜i) = ... =
pσˆ(m+n)(f−i, f˜i) = (NP, 0). Consider j’s deviation such that f˜j(NP, 0) = (y, k) and for
all k0, f˜j(Ck0) = fj(Ck0) for all Ck0 ∈ Ck0. Let m˜ be the step at which agent j proposed
(y, k) in the original equilibrium path; namely, j = σˆ(m˜) and pσˆ(m˜)(f−j, f˜j) = (y, k).
Let l = σˆ(m˜ + 1) = σˆ(m + 1) (i.e., σ(σ−1(j) + 1) = l). Consider the information
sets of agent l at the step m + 1 in pathσ(f−i, f˜i), Ck = {(y, k)} ∪ C, where C is
a (potentially empty) subset of A and at the step m˜ + 1 in pathσ(f−j, f˜j), C˜k =
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{(y, k)} . Observe that although Fl(C˜k) ⊇ Fl(Ck), C = Fl(C˜k)\Fl(Ck), and thus,
by IIA, if pσˆ(m+1)(f−i, f˜i) = (NP, 0) then pσˆ(m˜+1)(f−j, f˜j) = (NP, 0). Iterating this
argument, we deduce that pσˆ(m˜+1)(f−j, f˜j) = ... = pσˆ(m˜+n)(f−j, f˜j) = (NP, 0). Hence,
oσ,H1 (f−j, f˜j) = (y, k, j) and o
σ,H(f−j, f˜j, bσ)Pjoσ,H (f, bσ) , contradicting that gσ is a
SPNE of Γσ,H(R).
(1.1.2) oσ2(b
σ(x, k, i)) = (x, ∅) because the outcome of Stage 1, (x, k, i), has the prop-
erty that k > Σj∈Nπj (bσ(x, k, i)) . Then, by Claim 1, gσ is not a SPNE of Γσ,H(R).
Case 1.2: S 6= ∅.
Let (x, k, j) = oσ,H1 (f). Then, #S ≥ k. But then, by Proposition 3, S = Sx. Thus,
(x, S) is stable.
(2) oσ,H (f, bσ) = (x, S) is eﬃcient under R.
Assume (x, S) is stable but not eﬃcient under R. By Lemma 2, there exists a stable
allocation (y, Sy) such that (y, Sy)PD(x, S). First, note that Sy ⊇ S. By (Apa), Sy
is not empty. We distinguish between two diﬀerent cases:
Case 2.1: S = ∅.
(2.1.1) oσ,H1 (f) = (H(∅), ∅) = (x, S). There exists i ∈ Sy with the deviation g˜i =
(f˜i, bσi ) equal to gi = (fi, b
σ
i ) except that f˜i(NP, 0) = (y,#Sy). If (y,#Sy, i) is the
outcome of Stage 1 then, by Proposition 3, oσ,H(g−i, g˜i) = (y, Sy), contradicting that
g is a SPNE of Γσ,H(R). If oσ,H1 (f−i, f˜i) = (z, k, j) 6= (y,#Sy, i), with k ≥ #Sy, then
applying a similar argument than we use in case (1.1.1) to prove external stability
(and noting that (z, Sz)Rj(y, Sy)Pj(x, S)), we conclude that (z, k) was a profitable
deviation for agent j in the original path g.
(2.1.2) oσ2(b
σ(x, k, j)) = (x, ∅) because the outcome of Stage 1, (x, k, j), has the prop-
erty that k > Σj0∈Nπj0 (bσ(x, k, j)) . Then, by Claim 1, gσ is not a SPNE of Γσ,H(R).
Case 2.2: S 6= ∅.
Let oσ,H1 (f) = (x, k, i). Observe that, by Proposition 3, #S ≥ k and, by Claim 1,
i ∈ S. Hence, there exists an information set Ck0 such that fi(Ck0) = (x, k). Consider
the deviation f˜i equal to fi except that f˜i(Ck0) = (y,#Sy). If o
σ,H
1 (f−i, f˜i) = (y,#Sy, i)
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then i was not best replying since, by Proposition 3, oσ,H(g−i, g˜i) = (y, Sy). Assume
oσ,H1 (f−i, f˜i) = (z, t, j). By Claim 2, πj(b
σ(z, t, j)) = 1, and therefore, by Proposition
3, oσ2(b
σ(z, t, j)) = (z, Sz). Then, applying a similar argument than we use in case
(1.1.1) to prove external stability, we conclude that (z, t) was a profitable deviation
for agent j in the original path g.
(3) oσ,H (f, bσ) ∈MP (R).
Let (x, S) be stable and eﬃcient under R and assume there exists (y, Sy) maximal,
stable and eﬃcient under R such that #Sy > #S. Consider i ∈ Sy\S and a de-
viation f˜i such that in the information set Ck at the equilibrium path, f˜i (Ck) =
(y,#Sy). Either the outcome of Stage 1 is (y,#Sy), in which case g was not SPNE, or
oσ,H1 (f−i, f˜i) = (z, t, j) with t ≥ #Sy. By Proposition 3 and Claim 2, oσ2(bσ(z, t, j)) =
(z, Sz) and there exists l ∈ Sz\Sx who could have proposed (z, t) in the equilibrium
path of gσ. ¥
Proposition 5 Let R ∈ R, σ ∈ Σ, and H : 2X → X be given. Assume (f, bσ) is a
SPNE of Γσ,H(R). Then, oσ,H(f, bσ) = ϕH(R).
Proof Let H(MP (R)) = x. Assume Sx = ∅. Then the outcome of the game
Γσ,H(R) is unique and equal to (H(∅), ∅). In fact, by Proposition 3, no agent in
equilibrium will announce u in any subgame Γσ(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), since any proposer of a pair
inA will have to burden a cost; hence, in equilibrium no proposal inA is made in Stage
1. Observe that ϕH(R) = (x, ∅). Assume Sx 6= ∅ and let (y, Sy) be an equilibrium
outcome of Γσ,H(R) such that (x, Sx) 6= (y, Sy). By Proposition 4, y ∈ MP (R) and
#Sx = #Sy. If x = y then, by Lemma 1, Sx = Sy. Hence, x 6= y. Since (x, Sx) is
eﬃcient under R there exists i such that (x, Sx)Pi(y, Sy). Let gσ = (f, bσ) be a SPNE
strategy that generates (y, Sy) and consider the deviation f˜i consisting of proposing
(x,#Sx) just after y has been proposed (together with some integer smaller or equal
than #Sy). Then, by IIA of H, (x,#Sx, i) is the outcome of Stage 1. Hence, (x, Sx) is
the outcome of (gσ−i, g˜
σ
i ), contradicting that g
σ was a SPNE of Γσ,H(R). Since Γσ,H(R)
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is a finite extensive form game with perfect information it has at least a SPNE in
pure strategies. Therefore ϕH(R) = (H(MP (R)), SH(MP (R))) = (x, Sx). ¥
5.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Assume εi(f, bσ) > 0 for some i ∈ N . Then, by Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 4,
there are at least two agents who made a proposal at Stage 1. Let oσ,H1 (f) = (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ).
Claim 3 For all j ∈ N , fj(Ckˆ) = (NP, 0) for any Ckˆ ∈ Ckˆ such that (xˆ, kˆ) ∈ Ckˆ.
Proof of Claim 3 Suppose otherwise, and let fj(Ckˆ) = (y, k
0). Since oσ,H1 (f) =
(xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), k0 = k. Consider the consumption strategy f˜j that coincides with fj in
all information sets except those Ckˆ ∈ Ckˆ such that (xˆ, kˆ) ∈ Ckˆ, in which case,
f˜j(Ckˆ) = (NP, 0). Then, either o
σ,H
1 (f˜j, f−j) = (xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ), in which case fj is not a best
reply, or else oσ,H1 (f˜j, f−j) = (zˆ, qˆ, lˆ). But then, o
σ
2(b
σ[oσ,H1 (f˜j , f−j)])Plˆo
σ
2(b
σ[oσ,H1 (f)])
which means that agent lˆ has a profitable deviation from f . This proves the Claim.
By Claim 3 there exists j ∈ N such that fj(NP, 0) = (z, k˜) 6= (xˆ, kˆ). Moreover,
by Claim 2 in the proof of Proposition 4, πj(bσ[xˆ, kˆ, ıˆ]) = 1. Consider another con-
sumption strategy f˜j that coincides with fj in all information sets except in (NP, 0)
where f˜j(NP, 0) = (xˆ, kˆ). By IIA and Claim 3, o
σ,H
1 (f˜j, f−j) = (xˆ, kˆ, j) and agent j
does not have to burden a cost since his proposal has been selected. ¥
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